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I. INTRODUCTION
Congress passed the Communications Decency Act ("CDA") with the
intention of supporting and encouraging the proliferation of information on
the Internet.' The CDA gives Internet service providers immunity to any
* J.D. Candidate, 2008, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington; M.S., B.S.,
Marquette University. The author wishes to thank Michael Strain, J. Ryan Maloney, Joshua
A. Rademacher, Christopher M. Budd, Bret Kroeger, Meghan Tepas, Willard Hu, and all of
his Journal colleagues for their editorial support and recommendations.
1. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (2000).
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cause of action in which they might be treated as publishers of content
originating from third parties. A significant goal of this legislation was to
remove such operators' disincentives to voluntarily provide mechanisms to
police the content on their Web sites.
The 1968 Fair Housing Act ("FHA") protects the supply of housing
for those who may otherwise be discriminated against and functions to
reduce overall discrimination in the housing market.2 The plain language of
the statute indicates that it is intended to prevent newspapers and other
publishing media from publishing classified advertisements that mention
statutorily proscribed preferences in the sale or rental of a dwelling. The
FHA holds publishers of discriminatory advertisements legally responsible
for content provided by third parties.
The recent ruling in Chicago Lawyers' Commission for Civil Rights
Under the Law, Inc., v. Craigslist, Inc. renews past criticisms of the CDA
and foreshadows the unexpected yet nebulous marginalization of the FHA.3
As individuals seeking to advertise continue to migrate exponentially from
traditional print media to Internet bulletin boards and online classified
sections, the protections from discriminatory advertisements provided by
the FHA will be completely eroded.
This Note argues that Congress should add the FHA to the list of
exceptions to CDA immunity and is organized as follows: Section II is a
review of the history of the CDA and the application of § 230 immunity
during the rapid growth of Internet services; Section III discusses relevant
sections of the FHA dealing with housing advertisements; Section IV
provides a review and commentary on the recent decision in Craigslist;
Section V recommends congressional action; and Section VI concludes the
Note.
II. THE COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT
A. Pre-CDA
In 1995, Stratton Oakmont, Inc., a securities investment firm, brought
a defamation suit against Prodigy Services, an Internet company that
operated an online bulletin board.4 An unidentified user of the online
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3603, 3607 (2000).
3. Chicago Lawyers' Comm. for Civil Rights Under the Law, Inc., v. Craigslist, Inc.,
461 F. Supp. 2d 681 (N.D. Ill. 2006).
4. Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 1995 WL 323710, at *2 (N.Y.S.).
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bulletin board accused Stratton of criminal and fraudulent acts in
connection with an Initial Public Offering ("IPO"). The major issue facing
the court was whether Prodigy was the "publisher" of the third party
information. 5
Stratton argued that Prodigy qualified as the publisher of the
defamatory statements found on the online posting because the company
exercised editorial control over the forum. They further advocated that
Prodigy was liable for the damages resulting from the defamatory
statements under common law. 6 In contrast, Prodigy relied on the language
from an earlier defamation case where an analogous defendant was treated
as "a public library, book store, or newsstand," and not as the publisher of
defamatory statements posted by a third party.7
The language on which Prodigy relies is found in an earlier case,
Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc. In that case, the defendant, CompuServe,
operated an online general information service and provided access to a
variety of forums for its subscribers. Subscribers had access through a
journalism forum to Rumorville USA, a daily newsletter covering
developments in the world of journalism. 9 Cubby developed a similar
newsletter intended to compete with Rumorville. After the new service was
launched, false and defamatory statements regarding the Cubby newsletter
were published in Rumorville.10
Cubby brought suit against CompuServe seeking damages for the
allegedly defamatory statements. The district court granted summary
judgment on the libel claim in favor of CompuServe. The court treated the
defendant as a news distributor and held that it "may not be held liable if it
neither knew nor had reason to know of the allegedly defamatory
Rumorville statements."" Based on this holding, Prodigy hoped for the
same judicial protection.
Unfortunately for Prodigy, the court distinguished the earlier claim in
Cubby and held that the services it offered qualified the Internet service
provider as a publisher.1 2 Prodigy, unlike CompuServe, "implemented...
control through its automatic software screening program."1 3 It was
5. See id. at *3.
6. See id.
7. Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., 776 F.Supp. 135, 140 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
8. Id. at 137.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 138.
11. Id. at 141.
12. Stratton Oakmont, Inc., 1995 WL 323710, at *4.
13. Id. ("By actively utilizing technology and manpower to delete notes from its
computer bulletin boards on the basis of offensiveness and bad taste, for example, Prodigy is
clearly making decisions as to content.").
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Prodigy's affirmative action to police or attempt to control content
published on its Web site that gave rise to this tort liability. The stark
difference between rulings in Cubby and Stratton created the perverse
incentive for providers of interactive computer services to keep away from
policing third party content in order to avoid liability. Under Stratton, any
attempts to monitor the hundreds of thousands of postings could potentially
lead to liability for claims in which being defined as a "publisher" is an
essential element.
B. CDA as Congressional Response
Following the holding in Stratton, Congress was quick to respond.
The congressional solution to the dilemma was the Communications
Decency Act of 1996.14 The CDA overruled Stratton and removed the
deterrent to "Good Samaritan" blocking.' 5 The CDA is meant to further
two important policies: to remove the disincentive to police content and to
encourage the dissemination of words and ideas on the Internet. The
portion of the CDA that has been codified in § 230 is the most essential for
the purposes of this Note, and it demonstrates congressional intent to
further both of these policies.
The CDA establishes that it is the policy of the United States to
"remove disincentives for the development and utilization of blocking and
filtering technologies that empower parents to restrict their childrens'
access to objectionable or inappropriate online material.' 6 In fact, as the
name suggests, one of the primary purposes of the CDA is "to control the
exposure of minors to indecent material. ,1 7 It is § 230(c)(1) that eliminates
the disincentive to utilize such technologies. This section provides that "no
provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the
publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information
content provider.0
8
The second central policy of the CDA is the preservation of "the
vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists for the Internet
and other interactive computer services, unfettered by Federal or State
14. See Pub. L. No. 104-104, Title V (1996) (portions of the CDA have been struck
down as unconstitutional, but the section relevant to this article, Section 230, remains good
law).
15. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (2000).
16. 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(4).
17. Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1026 (9th Cir. 2003).
18. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).
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regulation."' 9 Congress, in its findings, commented that "the Internet and
other interactive computer services have flourished, to the benefit of all
Americans, with a minimum of government regulation., 20 Americans are
increasingly "relying on interactive media for a variety of political,
educational, cultural, and entertainment services."'', This second objective
of the CDA is meant to "avoid the chilling effect upon Internet free speech
that would be occasioned by the imposition of... liability upon companies
that do not create potentially harmful messages but are simply
intermediaries for their delivery.,
22
It is the second objective that seems to have been given the most
deference in the subsequent case law. The legislature has recognized that
the "developing array of Internet and other interactive computer services
available . represent an extraordinary advance in the availability of...
information resources. 23 Immunity under the CDA is essential to the
proliferation of information on the Internet because it protects those
channels through which such information is supplied. However, this
immunity is not absolute. Namely, there are three elements that are
required for immunity under the CDA: the defendant must be a provider or
user of an "interactive computer service, 24 the asserted claims must treat
the defendant as a publisher or speaker of the information, and the
information must be provided by another "information content provider."
25
Finally, by specific statutory exclusion, certain causes of action are not
proscribed.26
C. The CDA and the Internet
Internet service providers are treated differently from corresponding
publishers in print, television, and radio.27 This is the result of a
19. 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(2).
20. 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)(4).
21. 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)(5).
22. Delfino v. Agilent Techs., Inc., 145 Cal.App.4th 790, 802-03 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006).
23. 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)(1).
24. 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2) ("The term 'interactive computer service' means any
information service, system, or access software provider that provides or enables computer
access by multiple users to a computer server, including specifically a service or system that
provides access to the Internet and such systems operated or services offered by libraries or
educational institutions.").
25. 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3) ("The term 'information content provider' means any person
or entity that is responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development of
information provided through the Internet or any other interactive computer service.").
26. 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(1)-(4) (Causes of action based on (1) federal criminal law, (2)
intellectual property law, (3) state law that is "consistent with this section," and (4) the
Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986).
27. See Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1026-27 (9th Cir. 2003).
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congressional realization that civil, primarily tort-based, lawsuits pose a
significant threat to the spread of words and ideas in the "new and
burgeoning Internet medium."
'28
One reason that Internet service providers are treated differently is
that it is impossible for many of them to screen every posting, police every
forum, or monitor all of the content generated by the millions of regular
users.29 "Faced with potential liability for each message republished by
their services, interactive computer service providers might choose to
severely restrict the number and type of messages posted., 30 The policy
language of § 230 indicates that Congress considered the speech interests
implicated by the imposition of liability and determined that immunity for
these providers was a solution that would encourage, rather than mute, the
development of the Internet.
Any lawsuit that holds an Internet service provider out as a publisher
is prohibited by the statute. "Specifically, Section 230 precludes courts
from entertaining claims that would place a computer service provider in a
publisher's role."31 Traditional functions of a publisher include decisions
"whether to publish, withdraw, postpone or alter content. 32 Additionally,
this immunity extends to an Internet service provider that holds itself out as
reserving the right to exercise editorial functions, or utilizes terms or
conditions in the provision of Internet access.
33
While the plain text of § 230 only mentions immunity from publisher
liability, courts read the language broadly to include distributors as well. In
so doing, they treat distributor liability as a "subset, or species of publisher
liability." 34 Courts justify this broad reading by first alluding to the
congressional intent of the CDA. "Congress meant to insulate distributors
as well as publishers from liability for defamation. 35 Some courts also
ground this extension in the common law by pointing out that publishers
and distributors are equally liable for defamatory content.36
28. Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997).
29. See Noah v. AOL Time Warner, Inc., 261 F. Supp. 2d 532, 538 (E.D. Va. 2003).
30. Zeran, 129 F.3d at 331.
31. Id. at 330.
32. Id.
33. Schneider v. Amazon.com, 31 P.3d 37, 43 (Wash. App. 2001) ("[I]f actual editing
does not create liability, the mere right to edit can hardly do so.").
34. Zeran, 129 F.3d at 332.
35. Patentwizard, Inc. v. Kinko's, Inc., 163 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1071 (D.S.D. 2001).
36. Zeran, 129 F.3d at 332 ("[D]istributors are considered to be publishers for purposes
of defamation law.").
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Section 230 immunity is a threshold question and, when successfully
invoked, stops a claim at the pleadings. 37 While immunity is not absolute,
since its passing, § 230 has provided blanket immunity to many Internet
and interactive computer service providers on a variety of causes of
38
action. Decisions concerning the propriety of immunity tend to embrace a
broad interpretation of the statute in order to further the congressional goals
set out in the CDA. Section 230 "tends to promote the kind of unrestrained,
robust communication that many people view as the Internet's most
important contribution to society.,
39
"[C]ourts that have considered the question have held Section 230
provides immunity to civil claims generally." 40 The earliest instances where
CDA immunity was invoked often involved claims of online defamation.
For example, in Zeran v. America Online, Inc., the plaintiff sued America
Online ("AOL") after the company failed to promptly remove defamatory
statements posted in a chat room.
4l
In that case, an unidentified third party posted an advertisement for
"offensive and tasteless slogans related to the April 19, 1995, bombing of
the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City.' '42 The
advertisements encouraged people to call Zeran's home phone number.
Within eleven days Zeran was "receiving an abusive phone call
approximately every two minutes. ' 43 These calls included threats of
violence and death.44 The court held that § 230 gave AOL immunity from
the claim and, in so doing, ruled that the broad class of "Internet service
providers" are to be recognized as providers of interactive computer
services for the purpose of the statute.45
CDA immunity was expanded to Internet service providers who act as
distributors of defamatory material in Patentwizard, Inc. v. Kinko 's, Inc.
46
The plaintiff, Patentwizard, marketed software for people interested in
37. See Noah, 261 F. Supp. 2d at 537.
38. See generally Jonathan Band & Matthew Schruers, Safe Harbors Against the
Liability Hurricane: The Communications Decency Act and the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act, 20 CARDOzo ARTS & ENT. L.J. 295 passim (2002).
39. Patentwizard.,163 F. Supp. 2d at 1072; see Parker v. Google, Inc., 422 F. Supp. 2d
492, 501 n. 6 (E.D. Pa. 2006) (noting that "Courts have treated Section 230 immunity as
'quite robust."').
40. Schneider v. Amazon.com, 31 P.3d at 42; see also, Kathleen R. v. City of
Livermore, 87 Cal. App. 4th 684 (2001).
41. Zeran, 129 F.3d at 328 (Zeran argued "that AOL unreasonably delayed in removing
defamatory messages posted by an unidentified third party.").
42. Id. at 329.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 332; 47 U.S.C. § 230(0(2).
46. Patentwizard, 163 F. Supp. 2d at 1072.
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creating patents for their inventions and was operated by a patent law
firm. 47 Kinko's rented computers to individual users thereby giving them
access to the Internet. Kinko's made no attempts to record identities of the
persons to whom they rented and did not have a system to provide unique
Internet Protocol addresses to differentiate who was accessing the Internet
48through their service.
The court held that reclassifying Kinko's as a distributor was not a
legitimate way to avoid statutory immunity granted under § 230. The
holding acknowledged that such an attempt would impermissibly make the
defendant responsible for allegedly defamatory content that was published
by a third party.49 That is precisely the result Congress intended to avoid,
and thus why distributors are also protected by statutory immunity.
In Parker v. Google, Inc., the plaintiff alleged invasion of privacy in
addition to defamation.5° Defendant Google maintains a popular Web site
that provides technology that allows users to search for Web sites, images,
news, and maps. 5' Google derives "substantial financial benefit ... in the
form of advertising revenue and goodwill. ' 52 The court rejected the
plaintiff's attempt to hold Google liable for archived defamatory messages
posted by third parties. "In each instance raised by Plaintiff's tort claims,
Google either archived, cached, or simply provided access to content that
was created by a third party. 53 The court also held that § 230 barred the
claim that Google facilitated the invasion of plaintiff's privacy by
generating "an unauthorized biography" when a user enters his name in a
search query.54
In Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc.,55 § 230 was found to preclude
claims for invasion of privacy and misappropriation of right of publicity
that arose from the action of third parties utilizing Internet services. The
court held that the computer match-making service was immune from
47. See id. at 1070.
48. See id.
49. See id.
50. Parker v. Google, Inc., 422 F. Supp. 2d 492, 501 (E.D. Pa. 2006) ("It is clear that
Section 230 was intended to provide immunity for service providers like Google on exactly
the claims Plaintiff raises here.").
51. Google Home Page, http://www.google.com (last visited Nov. 6, 2007).
52. Parker, 422 F. Supp. 2d at 499.
53. Id. at 501.
54. See id. at 500.
55. Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2003).
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claims arising out of false content in a dating profile provided by someone
posing as another person. 6
One of the parties, Matchmaker,5 7 is an Internet dating service that
provides members with access for a fee. These members post anonymous
profiles and are then allowed access to view profiles of other members in
their area. Users have control of the information displayed in their profile,
although some of the content is formulated in response to a questionnaire
provided by Matchmaker. 8 Members contact each other via electronic mail
sent through the Matchmaker server.59
An unknown third party posted a fake profile of Carafano in the Los
Angeles section.60 Carafano is a popular actress who has appeared in
episodes of Star Trek: Deep Space Nine and General Hospital.6' This
profile provided Carafano's home address and telephone number. She
began to receive messages responding to the profile, some of which were
highly threatening and sexually explicit.
The court held that Matchmaker was not an "information content
provider" as contemplated by the statute because third parties, not
Matchmaker, determined the content of their profiles.62 This conclusion
was not affected by the fact that some of the content was formulated in
response to Matchmaker's questionnaire. The court added that even though
Matchmaker may be considered an information content provider in that it
generated the questionnaire, the statute precludes the treatment of a content
provider as a publisher or speaker for "any information provided by
another information content provider.,
63
In Doe v. GTE Corp.,64 the Seventh Circuit held that a plaintiff's
attempt to hold GTE liable for negligent entrustment must fail under § 230.
GTE provided Web hosting services to risqu6 Web sites65 that, among other
things, sold videotapes displaying undressed athletes. These tapes were the
product of secret video cameras placed in the locker rooms, bathrooms, and
showers of several college sports teams.66 GTE provided the services that
gave a third party the capability to publish a Web site on the Internet. An
56. Id. at 1121.
57. Online Dating, Singles, and Personals at Matchmaker.com, http://www.matchmaker
.com (last visited Nov. 6, 2007).
58. See Carafano, 339 F.3d at 1124.
59. See id. at 1121.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 1124.
63. ld.at 1125 (emphasis provided in original).
64. Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655 (7th Cir. 2003).
65. Id. at 657 (one such site included in the opinion was www.youngstuds.com).
66. Id. at 656.
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unknown customer used this capability to publish nude images and videos
over GTE's network.67
The plaintiffs unsuccessfully alleged that GTE was negligent in
allowing a person to use its Web services to disseminate injurious content.
In its ruling, the court established that there is no requirement "that a
service provider must take reasonable care to prevent injury to third
parties."68 A ruling to the contrary would not be faithful to the efforts to
encourage the development of such networks.
In Schneider v. Amazon.com,69 the number of claims precluded by §
230 was further broadened to include negligent misrepresentation and
tortious interference. In that case, the plaintiff wrote several books relating
to taxation and asset protection and made them available for sale on
Amazon.com. 70 A feature of the Amazon Web site was a forum that
allowed visitors to voice their opinions about books they have read.71 To
the chagrin of the plaintiff, this forum included postings of negative third
party comments about the plaintiff and his books. 2
Among the many claims, the plaintiff alleged negligent
misrepresentation and tortious interference.73 The court concluded that the
ultimate effect would be to hold Amazon out as the source of the negative
comments and reviews, which is impermissible under § 230. 74 The court
analogized Amazon's feedback forum to AOL's message board for § 230
purposes.75
AOL was again named as a defendant in Green v. America Online,76
and Noah v. AOL Time Warner, Inc.77 AOL provides a "number of online
communications tools, such as e-mail, news groups, and chat rooms, that
allow its subscribers to communicate with one another and with other users
of the Internet. ' '78 The company's millions of subscribers generate a
substantial volume of information that is constantly transmitted over its
67. Id. at 657.
68. Id. at 661.
69. Schneider v. Amazon.com, 31 P.3d 37 (Wash. App. 2001).
70. Id. at 38.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 40.
76. Green v. Am. Online, Inc., 318 F.3d 465 (3d Cir. 2003).
77. Noah v. AOL Time Warner, Inc., 261 F. Supp. 2d 532 (E.D. Va. 2003).
78. Green, 318 F.3d at 469.
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network.79 AOL is one of the world's largest interactive computer services
with millions of members.80
In Green, the plaintiff alleged "that AOL was negligent in
promulgating harmful content and in failing to address certain harmful
content on its network."8' The plaintiff argued that the existence and terms
of a member agreement82 between AOL and its customers gave rise to a
duty on its part to enforce the agreement. The plaintiff asserted that
messages transmitted during the course of conversations over the AOL
network were in violation of this member agreement.83 The court held that
the agreement "tracks the provisions of section 230," and that Green's tort
claims were subject to AOL's immunity under § 230.84 Regardless of the
agreement, the purpose of § 230 is to protect service providers, such as
AOL, who facilitate the spread of large volumes of third party content.
Finally, in Noah, the court held that § 230 immunity precluded a
claim under Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and a claim for
injunctive relief.85 Noah, a Muslim, alleged that AOL "wrongfully refused
to prevent participants in an online chat room from posting or submitting
harassing comments that blasphemed and defamed plaintiff's Islamic
religion."8 6 The plaintiff complained that he and other Muslims were
treated poorly in AOL chat rooms due to their religious beliefs.87 If true,
this behavior was in direct violation of the Member Agreement and
Community Guidelines established by AOL for each of its subscribing
members.88
The court held that the equitable relief sought, the injunction, was
within the scope of § 230 immunity. The judge explained that the purpose
of § 230 is to protect Internet service providers from legal liability for
content provided by third parties. 89 The court broadened the protections
granted under § 230 by declaring that statutory immunity is not restricted to
actions for monetary damages.
79. Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 329 (4th Cir. 1997).
80. Green, 318 F.3d at 469.
81. Id. at471.
82. Id. at 469 ("A subscriber to AOL must agree to the terms of its Member Agreement,
which requires subscribers to adhere to AOL's standards for online speech and conduct set
forth in AOL's 'Community Guidelines."').
83. Id. at 468.
84. Id. at471.
85. Noah v. AOL Time Warner, Inc. 261 F.Supp. 2d 532, 537 (E.D. Va. 2003).
86. Id. at 534.
87. See id. at 535 (claiming that other AOL members "harassed, insulted, threatened,
ridiculed and slandered" the plaintiff and other Muslims).
88. Id.
89. Id. at 540.
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The court concluded that the injury claimed by the plaintiff and the
remedy sought requires AOL to be treated as a publisher of the content that
was in violation of Title 11.90 Such treatment would itself violate § 230.91 In
its discussion, the court returned to the congressional finding that liability
in such situations would lead to a restriction of access to public forums.
92
Specifically, AOL's immunity from liability under § 230 stems from the
fact that third party members, not AOL itself, provided the egregious
content complained of by the plaintiff.93 Most interestingly, the court
explained further that the language in § 230 is sufficiently broad to include
claims brought under the federal civil rights statutes.94
For all of its virtues and policy objectives, immunity under § 230 has
not survived without scrutiny.95 With that said, it would seem that the
original end of § 230 has been realized: the defeat of the specter of tort
liability for service providers. Looking forward, the Noah decision
foreshadows the potential reach of § 230 immunity. The court itself
recognized "a darker side of what has been called 'the robust nature of
Internet communication.', 96 This decision reveals that the next victim of §
230 could be the protections afforded by traditional civil rights statutes.
III. THE FAIR HOUSING ACT
The Fair Housing Act was enacted in 1968, and it makes
discrimination in most residential dwellings on the basis of race, color,
religion, and national origin illegal.97 Congress amended the FHA in 1974
to include "sex" as a protected status.98 In 1988, the FHA was expanded
90. Id. at 538.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 539.
95. Jonathan Band & Matthew Schruers, Safe Harbors Against the Liability Hurricane:
The Communications Decency Act and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 20 CARDOZO
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 295 (2002); Robert T. Langdon, The Communications Decency Act §230:
Make Sense? Or Nonsense? - A Private Person's Inability to Recover if Defamed in
Cyberspace, 73 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 829 (1999).
96. Noah, 261 F.Supp.2d at 540.
97. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3603, 3607 (2000). The FHA exempts certain single-family houses
sold or rented by their owners, units in owner-occupied apartment buildings containing four
or fewer units, and certain dwellings operated by religious organizations and private clubs.
98. See Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383, 808,
88 Stat. 633, 728 (1974).
[Vol. 60
HOUSING AD VERTISEMENTS
further to protect "handicap" and "familial status." 99 The relevant section of
the FHA, for the purposes of this Note, is § 3604(c), which makes it
unlawful to:
make, print, or publish . any notice, statement, or advertisement,
with respect to the sale or rental of a dwelling that indicates any
preference, limitation, or discrimination based on race, color, religion,
sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin, or an intention to
make any such preference, limitation, or discrimination.
00
Section 3604(c) of the FHA serves two primary purposes. The first is to
protect and increase housing choices of individuals who may otherwise be
discriminated against because of their "status."'' m The second is to
eliminate prejudices based on race, religion, sex, familial status, handicap,
and ethnicity in the housing market.1
0 2
This section has also withstood constitutional challenges under the
First Amendment. In Ragin v. New York Times Co.,10 3 the court held that
the prohibition of discriminatory advertisements does not violate the First
Amendment right to free speech, and that the publication of advertisements
indicating the prohibited preferences is not protected commercial speech.
°4
In United States v. Hunter,105 the court ruled that § 3604(c) did not violate
the First Amendment guarantee of freedom of the press because it did not
restrict the free function of news operations. 0 6 The court insisted that a
newspaper publisher can "easily distinguish between permissible and
impermissible advertisements."'
0 7
When determining whether an advertisement or notice violates §
3604(c), the court must "ask whether [the advertisement or notice] suggests
to an ordinary listener that people with a particular familial status are
preferred or dispreferred for the housing in question."' 08 To establish a
violation of § 3604(c), the plaintiff only needs to prove that the challenged
advertisement or notice has a discriminatory effect, not necessarily that
there exists a discriminatory intent. 9
99. See Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-430, 6, 102 Stat. 1619,
1622 (1988).
100. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) (2000).
101. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604 (a),(d),(f) (specifically noting the "otherwise make
unavailable" language in each of the sections).
102. See Fair Hous. Council of Bergen County, Inc., v. E. Bergen County Multiple
Listing Serv., Inc., 422 F. Supp. 1071, 1075 (D.N.J. 1976).
103. Ragin v. New York Times Co., 923 F.2d 995 (2d Cir. 1991).
104. Id. at 1002-03.
105. United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205 (4th Cir. 1972).
106. Id. at 213.
107. Id.
108. Burnett v. Venturi, 903 F. Supp. 304, 315 (N.D.N.Y. 1995).
109. Davis v. New York City Hous. Auth., 278 F.3d 64, 81 (2d Cir. 2002).
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The plain language of § 3604(c) indicates that it is intended to prevent
newspapers from publishing classified advertisements that mention
"statutorily proscribed preferences in the sale or rental of a dwelling.""
Hunter extrapolates the applicability of § 3604(c) from "newspapers" to
"any publishing medium."' .' While it is third parties, landlords, and
brokers who generate listings, it is the traditional print media that
ultimately prints and publishes them. "
2
In Saunders v. General Services Corp.,113 the court held that
advertising brochures with a fairly homogenous nondiverse set of models
demonstrated illegal racial preferences. The court determined that the
"natural interpretation of the... brochure" was that apartment complexes
were for white tenants, and that such a message discouraged blacks from
seeking housing there. 1
4
The court extended liability to a housing information vendor for the
actions of its agents in United States v. Space Hunters, Inc." 5 It determined
that an employee of the vendor violated § 3604(c) when he made
discriminatory statements to deaf individuals who called to express an
interest in housing." 6 All attempts at contacting the service that originated
from a deaf individual and were relayed through a telecommunication
device for the deaf ("TDD")' 17 were met with inflammatory comments and
a refusal to continue with the call."
8
The FRA has also been used to stop or terminate attempts to "racially
steer" ' 9 a population. Often geographic areas are served by a multiple
listing service which aggregates listings, issues regular updates, and
110. Hunter, 459 F.2d at 210; see also Ragin 923 F.2d at 999-1002.
111. Hunter, 459 F.2d at 211.
112. Id. at210.
113. Saunders v. General Services Corp., 659 F. Supp 1042, 1057-59 (E.D. Va. 1987).
114. Id. at 1058.
115. United States v. Space Hunters, Inc., 429 F.3d 416, 424-25 (2d Cir. 2005).
116. Id. at 427-30.
117. See id. at 420 n.1 ("The deaf individual types a message on the TDD keyboard,
which is transmitted over telephone lines to a relay service operator who reads the message
to the person on the other end of the call. The relay service operator then types the person's
response, which is transmitted back to the screen of the deaf individual's TDD") (internal
citation omitted).
118. Seeid. at420.
119. See Fair Hous. Council of Bergen County, 422 F. Supp. at 1075 (defining racial
steering as "directing white customers away from black or interracial neighborhoods and
directing black customers away from white or interracial neighborhoods").
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engages in cooperative advertising. 20 In Bergen, a multiple listing service
used selective advertising as one of many tactics to discriminate on the
basis of race among prospective customers.'
2
'
As noted in Hunter, in addition to the original source of a notice,
statement, or advertisement, liability under the FHA falls on those who
publish such advertisements. 122 It is immediately apparent how § 3604(c) of
the FHA and § 230 of the CDA are at odds with each other. Publishers who
were once deterred from publishing advertisements in violation of §
3604(c) by the risk of liability are now shrouded in immunity on the
Internet. Section 3604(c) will be particularly challenged as the Internet
expands and online forums and posting boards become the classified
sections of the twenty-first century.
IV. CRAIGSLIST
A. Decision
Craigslist began in 1995 as an online source of advertisements and
forums and now serves 450 cities throughout the United States.' 23 The Web
site is user-moderated and was incorporated as a for-profit entity in 1999,
earning income from job postings and residential brokers in select cities. 24
Craigslist gets five billion hits per year, making it the seventh most
frequented Web site on the Internet behind those operated by Yahoo!,
AOL, Microsoft, Google, eBay, and Newscorp. 125 Originally, postings
on Craigslist were relevant only to those in the San Francisco community-
the locale of founder and programmer Craig Newmark.12 6 Since then,
Craigslist has experienced tremendous growth that is expected to continue
into the future. 127 In 2004, eBay acquired a twenty-five percent stake in the
company.
28
120. See Wheatley Heights Neighborhood Coalition v. Jenna Resales Co., 447 F. Supp.
838, 840-42 (E.D.N.Y. 1978); Bergen, 422 F. Supp. at 1075.
121. Bergen, 422 F. Supp. at 1075.
122. Hunter, 459 F.2d at 209-10.
123. See Craigslist Factsheet, http://sfbay.craigslist.org/about/factsheet.html (last visited
Nov. 6, 2007).
124. Id.
125. See Pages vs Employees, http://www.craigslist.org/about/pages.and.peeps.html (last
visited Nov. 6, 2007).
126. See Amy Schein, Craigslist, Inc., Information and Related Industry Information,
HOOVERS, http://premium.hoovers.com/subscribe/co/factsheet.xhtml?ID--rtsjrkrtkffxhcy
(last visited Nov. 6, 2007).
127. See Craigslist Factsheet, supra note 123.
128. See id.
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The Chicago Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under the Law
("CLC") filed suit under the FHA against Craigslist in 2006 seeking
various forms of relief.1 29 CLC is a nonprofit organization formed from an
alliance of Chicago law firms committed to public interest pro bono
community service. 13 The mission of the CLC is "to promote and protect
civil rights ...of poor, minority and disadvantaged people in order to
facilitate their participation in the social, economic and political systems of
our nation."' 3' CLC filed suit in the Northern District of Illinois alleging
that Craigslist was operating in violation of § 3604(c).1 32
The district court granted Craigslist's pretrial motion on the
pleadings, holding that CLC's claim must fail as a matter of law. 133 The
court began its analysis by discussing the relevant sections of both the FHA
and the CDA. This included a brief laundry list of media to which §
3604(c) applies. 34
The court then quickly moved on to § 230(c)(1) and the "near-
unanimous case law.' 35 It held that the plain language of § 230 gives
federal immunity to any action making service providers liable for content
originating from a third party. 36 The court was tedious in its insistence that
its holding was narrower than that in Zeran. It explained that the protection
from liability only extends to those causes of action "that would require
treating an ICS as a publisher of third-party content."' 137 The decision in
Craigslist is not surprising because it is consistent with the body of CDA
129. Chicago Lawyers' Comm. for Civil Rights Under the Law, Inc., v. Craigslist, Inc.,
461 F. Supp. 2d 681 (N.D. Ill. 2006).
130. See Chicago Lawyers' Committee Home Page, http://www.clccrul.org/index.html
(last visited Nov. 6, 2007).
131. See Chicago Lawyers' Committee Overview, http://www.clccrul.org/press-kit/
overview.html (last visited Nov. 6, 2007).
132. See Chicago Lawyers' Comm. for Civil Rights Under the Law, Inc., 461 F. Supp. 2d
at 682 ("CLC allege[d] that ... Craiglist publishes notices, statements, or advertisements
with respect to the sale or rental of dwellings that indicate (1) a preference, limitation, or
discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin;
and (2) an intention to make a preference, limitation, or discrimination on the basis of race,
color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin" in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c).).
133. Id.
134. Id. at687.
135. Id at 687-88.
136. See id. at 693.
137. Id.
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jurisprudence. One lawyer observed, "It's very clear under these precedents
that Craigslist shouldn't be held liable for ads provided by third parties."
'13 8
Similar to the civil rights plaintiff in Noah, CLC put forth the
argument that § 230 immunity "does not apply to claims brought under
federal civil rights statutes."1 39 The court deferred to the language in the
statute and the corresponding congressional intent. "[R]egardless of
whether Congress chose Sectuib 230(c)(1)'s language with the FHA in
mind, what is important here is that the plain meaning of the statute is not
at odds with Congress' intent."'
' 40
B. Life After Craigslist
Craigslist's expansion of § 230 immunity to claims brought under the
FHA has at least two important implications. The first is the creation of a
congressional shield for operators of online housing advertisement and
classified sections. The second, arising from, and a consequence of this
shroud of immunity, is the emasculation of § 3604(c).
Section 230, in effect, gives Internet service providers a monopoly in
the market for discriminatory housing advertisements. "In some sort of tacit
quid pro quo arrangement with the service provider community, Congress
has conferred immunity from tort liability as an incentive to Internet
service providers to self-police the Internet for obscenity and other
offensive material, even where the self-policing is unsuccessful or not even
attempted.' 14 1 Immunity allows online classified forums to underprice their
traditional newsprint rivals and increase their customer base by serving
those who would have traditionally had no market-namely, those who
want to advertise a prohibited preference. 1
42
As an illustrative thought experiment, imagine a rental advertisement
that expresses a preference for a "Clean Godly Christian Male.' 43 The
creator of the advertisement is clearly subject to sanctions under § 3604(c),
but what is relevant is the difference in how potential publishers of that
notice are treated. A newspaper could not publish such an advertisement
138. Mike Hughlett, Judge: Craigslist Not Liable for Ad Content, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 16,
2006, at B1.
139. Noah, 261 F. Supp. 2d at 539
140. Chicago Lawyers' Comm. for Civil Rights Under the Law, Inc., 461 F. Supp. 2d at
697 (emphasis in original).
141. Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 52 (D.D.C. 1998).
142. Cf Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655, 660 (7th Cir. 2003) ("As precautions are
costly, not only in direct outlay but also in lost revenue from the filtered customers, ISPs
may be expected to take the do-nothing option and enjoy immunity under § 230(c)(1).").
143. See Chicago Lawyers' Comm. for Civil Rights Under the Law, Inc., 461 F. Supp. 2d
at 686 (one of the actual samples of allegedly objectionable statements within rental
postings on Craigslist's Web site included in the CLC complaint).
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because they would be subject to liability. As "publisher," they have to
expend resources on screening such notices and ensuring compliance with
fair housing law. Additionally, because they are turning away potential
customers, they are subject to an additional expense.
On the other hand, an Internet service provider, such as Craigslist,
would be immune from liability for that notice. As a result, they do not
have to dedicate resources to compliance or screening. Immunity also
removes the necessity for the provider to differentiate between customers.
In other words, all are welcome. Under the law as it currently stands, the
aforementioned advertisement can and will only be published in one
location-on the Internet.
Besides the cost advantage and larger potential market, treating online
advertisers differently than traditional print media will tend to result in
wasteful litigation over the issue. Studies have shown that "[e]qual
protection of a uniform law tends to reduce both sorts of unproductive
conflict, and thereby increases . . . economic efficiency."' 44 Newspapers
and other forms of traditional print media depend on advertising to
subsidize the cost of the rest of the paper. 45 A competitor has every
incentive to attempt to challenge an issue as vital as "publisher
immunity.' ' 146 In this case, the industry lines were drawn. There were ten
amici briefs filed in support of Craigslist by other service providers. 47 It is
also not surprising that Craigslist was challenged in a district court in
Illinois by a conglomerate of Chicago law firms. Chicago is home to one of
the nation's largest newspaper companies, Tribune Company.
148
Perhaps the more nebulous consequence of § 230 immunity is the
undermining of the FHA in the Internet era. The Internet is now a
prominent medium for classified advertisements. 149 The continued
144. Roger Congleton, Political Efficiency and Equal Protection of the Law, 50
KYKLOS 485, 496 (1997).
145. United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205, 212 (4th Cir. 1972) ("[Tlhe revenue
newspapers derive from advertising makes possible the publication of the rest of the
paper.").
146. See Congleton, supra note 144, at 496 ("For every group that might try to advantage
itself by influencing policy there is another which should attempt to prevent it. As the
literature on rent-seeking points out, even peaceful conflict over fundamental law may be
intense and wasteful").
147. See Chicago Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under the Law, Inc., 461 F.
Supp. 2d at 683.
148. See Tribune Company Web Guide, http://www.tribune.com/about/webguide/
index.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2007).
149. See Online Advertising: Pay Per Sale, The Economist, Oct. 1, 2005, at 82.
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expansion of the Internet is driven by consumers' shifting from traditional
print to the Internet for news, from brochures to Web sites for information,
and from classified ads to online forums for consumption needs.
50
When the provisions of the FHA were first passed, the now traditional
news services raised similar arguments concerning freedom of speech,
freedom of press, and economic ramifications of liability for third party
content.' 5' However, at that time there were no suitable substitutes for
publication forums. The courts then had no way of predicting the
emergence of the Internet and consequently dismissed these claims. 5 2 Now
content that was once subject to civil rights compliance, when shifted to the
Internet, is content that is moved out of reach of the FHA.
Finally, the prohibition on publishing discriminatory advertisements
is ancillary to the actual goal of preventing their creation. The permanence
of publication in newsprint deters a third party from generating an
advertisement in violation of § 3604(c) because of the probability he or she
will be caught. "Since the Act also bars private publication of
discriminatory advertisements, an advertiser has no incentive to abandon
his regular use of newspapers to publicize his offer to sell or rent."'
' 53
However, the Internet is different because it offers anonymity for private
parties. Given the ease of removal and unlikelihood that the user will be
traced, there is a small probability that a person may be caught.
Consequently, the deterrent to the creation of such advertisements is
softened.
The fact is that in the current Internet climate, private parties now
have incentives to abandon the regular use of newspapers, contrary to the
dicta in Hunter. It is important to remember that all those who decide to
advertise on the Internet do not do so only because they are free to publish
otherwise discriminatory advertising, although there may still be a minority
for which this is the sole motive. The main reason for the transition to the
Internet is that it is a low cost, vibrant source of information, and the
advertisements on the Internet are exposed to millions daily. Given this
changing tide, if the original purpose of the FHA is to be advanced in the
Internet era, congressional action is required.
150. See Craigslist Factsheet, supra note 123. There are now Craigslist sites in 450 cities
across the United States. Additionally, Craigslist users publish 20 million new classified ads
each month, and the site receives more than 8 billion page views per month.
151. See Ragin v. New York Times Co., 923 F.2d 995, 999 (2d Cir. 1991).
152. See United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205, 212 (4th Cir. 1972) ("We therefore
doubt that the Act will deprive a newspaper of any revenue.").
153. Id.
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V. SUGGESTED CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE
A Ninth Circuit opinion discussing § 230 immunity began, "[t]here is
no reason inherent in the technological features of cyberspace why First
Amendment and defamation law should apply differently in cyberspace
than in the brick and mortar world.' ' l5 4 However, because of the policy
objectives included in the CDA, Congress has decided to treat providers of
interactive computer services differently than other information providers
such as newspapers, magazines, or television stations, all of which may be
held liable for third-party content.
The plain language of § 230 demonstrates that Congress did not
intend to include federal civil rights claims. 55 In fact, since only four
classes of claims are excluded, the judicial treatment of § 230 is appropriate
given the statutory construction. The apt question is whether this was
purposeful or the result of oversight.
It is incontrovertible that if the provisions of the FHA are still of
interest, Congress should add FHA compliance to what is already carved
out from § 230 immunity. Adding a fifth exception is a fair and reasonable
solution. The first result of such an action would be to eliminate the
government-created competitive advantage over traditional print.
Additionally it would be an essential step in ensuring that the FHA adapts
to and survives in a climate of changing technology. Finally, the fifth
exception would not require Congress to depart from the original goals of §
230.
The main argument against subjecting Internet service providers to
liability for third-party content is that it would deter speech on the Internet.
The concern is that providers would have a natural incentive to simply
remove messages upon notification, whether the contents were offensive or
not.' 56 Taken in consideration of the FHA, this concern is countered by the
need to combat discrimination in the housing market. Given the narrow
focus of § 3604(c), treating Internet service providers as publishers with
regard to third party advertisements should not have the general chilling
effect on speech contemplated by Congress. 57 The only speech targeted by
154. Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1020 (9th Cir. 2003).
155. See Noah v. AOL Time Warner, Inc., 261 F. Supp. 2d 532, 539 (E.D. Va. 2003).
156. Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 333 (4th Cir. 1997).
157. See United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205, 212 (4th Cir. 1972) ("[I]t has been held
that a newspaper will not be insulated from the otherwise valid regulation of economic
activity merely because it also engages in constitutionally protected dissemination of
ideas.").
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such a measure, the only speech that would be chilled, does not enjoy
protected status. 158
A second concern, as expressed in Zeran, is that liability would cause
Internet providers to limit the scope and scale of their services. Holding
Internet content providers liable for FHA violations, similar to their
traditional print counterpart, should not have this effect. Web sites such as
Craigslist already compartmentalize online forums and bulletin boards for
ease of access and to increase the relevance of search. 59 The resources
needed to monitor such areas and ensure compliance would be focused
only on these already demarcated areas where potential violations could be
posted. Furthermore, these Web sites are profitable. The additional cost
imposed by publisher liability should not be expected to offset the ability of
Internet service providers to offer services profitably. Congress must
decide if the value of FHA protections outweighs the potential costs of
restricting the supply of housing advertisement forums. In 1968 they
answered this question in the affirmative."°
VI. CONCLUSION
The Internet is a source of new competition and challenges for
traditional print media. Internet service providers should be forced to
compete with traditional print media through innovation and not through
congressional protection. The recent ruling in Craigslist signals a need to
reconsider the CDA in light of the potential marginalization of the FHA.
When Congress passed the CDA, they intended to support and
encourage the spread of words and ideas on the Internet. However, not all
words and ideas are entitled to protection under the law. The FHA limits a
form of commercial speech to protect the supply of housing for those who
may otherwise be discriminated against. Congress should add the FHA to
the current list of exceptions to § 230 immunity.
Enforcing § 3604(c) against service providers will not mean the end
of the Internet. Internet service providers will adjust to the legislation the
same way their traditional print predecessors did in the 1960's and 1970's.
They will segment and monitor popular and profitable advertisement
sections. With the advancement of Internet technology, applying FHA
liability to Internet service providers is a necessary step in Congress's
noble original goal of eliminating discrimination in the housing market.
158. See Ragin v. New York Times Co., 923 F.2d 995, 1002-03 (2d Cir. 1991).
159. For example, the following link displays the housing forum for Bloomington,
Indiana: Bloomington Housing Classifieds - Craigslist, http://bloomington.craigslist.org/
forums/?forumlD=6 (last visited Nov. 6, 2007).
160. See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 3603, 3607 (2000).
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